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ESSAY 
 
AEREO AND COPYRIGHT’S PRIVATE–PUBLIC 
PERFORMANCE LINE 
GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR.† 
e Copyright Act of 1976 provides to copyright owners the exclusive 
right to perform their copyrighted works publicly, but not the exclusive 
right to perform their works privately. As a result, to determine whether 
any given performance infringes a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, we 
must draw a line between public and private performances. While drawing 
such a line might appear a simple task, it has proven surprisingly difficult. 
The current line between public and private performances is more a historical 
accident, coupled with historical path dependence, than a rational attempt to 
advance copyright’s purposes.  
On January 10, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in American 
Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.1 By doing so, the Court has seized an oppor-
tunity to bring some rationality to copyright’s line between public and 
private performances. In this pending case, the respondent, Aereo, uses 
thousands of tiny antennae to capture television broadcast signals, which 
then transmit the signals to its subscribers over the Internet.2 e question 
presented is whether Aereo “publicly performs” the copyrighted works 
carried in the television broadcast signals that are captured and retransmitted.3  
 
† McGlinchey Stafford Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. I would like to 
thank James Grimmelman for his help facilitating this Essay’s publication, and Tyler Ochoa, 
David Post, and Rebecca Tushnet for their helpful comments on the Aereo issues.  
1 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014), granting cert. to WNET, irteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
2 See generally Aereo, 712 F.3d at 680-83 (detailing Aereo’s transmission system from the sub-
scriber’s perspectives, and with regard to its technical aspects). 
3 Brief for Petitioners at i, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 896 (No. 13-461).  
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Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not clear from the relevant 
statutory language. The petitioners insist that Aereo’s service is the technical 
equivalent of cable, and as such, is a public performance.4 Aereo counters 
that its service is the technical equivalent of a thousand rooftop antennae on 
a thousand private homes, and as such, is a private performance.5 Two 
judges on the Second Circuit panel below agreed with Aereo and held that 
Aereo had not publicly performed the copyrighted television programs at 
issue.6 The third, agreeing with the petitioners’ characterization, dissented.7   
Ultimately, however, both sides misused their analogies. Aereo is not 
the technical equivalent of either a cable provider or a thousand rooftop 
antennae. Rather, Aereo is the technical equivalent of both. Regardless of 
whether the focus is on cable providers, rooftop antennae installers, or 
Aereo, each service acts as an intermediary enabling individual consumers to 
receive broadcast signals and watch copyrighted television programs in the 
privacy of their own homes. Treating Aereo as analogous to only a cable 
provider, or only rooftop antennae, will not work.  
Instead of employing superficial analogies or the siren call of technical 
neutrality, I suggest that we look at the underlying economics. When 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress expressly required 
cable providers to obtain public-performance licenses for the private 
performances they enable.8 However, Congress refused to require such 
licenses for rooftop antennae installers.9 ough historical path dependence 
undoubtedly played a role, a rational basis exists for this distinction. 
Specifically, cable providers enjoy a substantial degree of market power, 
arising from the naturally monopolistic character of their service. In 
contrast, rooftop antennae installers do not.  
This distinction creates three important differences in the economic 
consequences that follow when the public-performance right covers an 
intermediary’s activities. First and most specifically, an intermediary’s 
market power determines the extent to which a licensing fee, if one is 
required, would be paid by the intermediary itself—rather than passed 
along to consumers in the form of higher prices. us, the congressional 
 
4 See id. at 26-31 (“Aereo . . . is no more a mere equipment provider than a cable or satellite 
company; it is clearly performing the content it uses to market its service.”). 
5 See Brief for Respondent at 16, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 896 (No. 13-461) (emphasizing that Aereo’s 
technology relies on individual antennae assigned to each user). 
6 See Aereo, ��� F.�d at ��� (affirming the judgment for Aereo below). 
7 See id. at 696-97 (Chin, J., dissenting) (labeling Aereo’s retransmission system a “sham”). 
8 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § ���(c)(�), �� Stat. ����, ���� (codified at �� 
U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2012)). 
9 Id. § 110(5) (2012). 
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distinction identifies those cases where a licensing requirement would not 
double-charge consumers for watching television. Second, the intermediary’s 
market power also determines the extent to which the intermediary earns 
rents—or profits in excess of normal returns on the costs of providing its 
services. erefore, the market-power distinction identifies instances where 
rents accrue, and where a license requirement would force the intermediary 
to share a portion of those rents with the copyright owners whose works 
helped generate them. Third and finally, the market-power distinction 
determines the extent to which a licensing fee, if required, would represent 
an additional source of revenue for copyright owners, rather than simply 
cannibalize existing advertising-based revenue streams. It thus identifies 
those instances where a licensing fee will most substantially increase 
revenue to copyright owners.  
The market-power distinction thus provides a rational basis for distin-
guishing between cable providers and rooftop antennae installers. ough 
both serve as intermediaries that enable otherwise identical private performances, 
one enjoys market power, while the other does not. That difference, on its 
own, fully justifies Congress’s decision to treat cable and antennae installers 
differently under the Copyright Act’s public-performance right.  
When we extend this analysis to Aereo, the key question becomes 
whether Aereo is more likely (i) to have market power arising from the 
naturally monopolistic character of its service, like cable, or (ii) to face a 
competitive marketplace, like antennae installers. ough Aereo’s service 
may be the technical equivalent of both cable and antennae installers, it is 
the economic equivalent of only one. Whatever temporary lead-time 
advantage Aereo may presently have, there is nothing unique about the 
service it provides. Given the technology that Aereo employs, anyone can 
set up a similar service. Once the legality of its business practice becomes 
clear, we should fully expect other parties to do so. As a result, Aereo is far 
more likely to face the same sort of competitive marketplace that antennae 
installers face than to enjoy cable’s natural-monopoly position. Aereo’s 
activities should not, therefore, constitute a public performance.  
e following explores these issues in more detail. Part I explores the 
historical background and the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Aereo case. 
Part II then develops the argument for distinguishing public and private 
performances by focusing on whether the intermediary at issue is likely to 
have market power. Part III concludes. 
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I. HOW CABLE TELEVISION CAME TO BE A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, 
AND WHAT THAT MEANS FOR AEREO 
Aereo is not the first case to come before the Court regarding the proper 
scope of the public-performance right. In the years leading up to the 
Copyright Act of 1976’s enactment, the Court faced a similar public-
performance question. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.10 
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,11 the Supreme 
Court confronted the question of whether, under the Copyright Act of 
1909, community antenna television (“CATV”) systems, which captured 
public television broadcasts with a few large antennae and retransmitted 
them to their subscribers, were publicly performing the copyrighted television 
programs contained in the broadcasts.12 e Court held that the CATV 
systems were not.13 In the Court’s view, a broadcaster performs a copyrighted 
television program when it selects the program for broadcast, converts it 
into electronic signals, and then transmits those signals as radio waves for 
public reception.14 In contrast, members of the public who use antenna and 
television sets to convert those electronic signals back into the visual images 
and audible sounds do not perform a copyrighted television program.15 
Between these two roles, the Court concluded that CATV “falls on the 
viewer’s side of the line”16 and thus did not perform the copyrighted 
television programs it broadcasted.17   
However, Congress expressly rejected this outcome when it enacted the 
Copyright Act of 1976.18 In the 1976 Act, Congress added a “transmit” 
 
10 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
11 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
12 See id. at 396-97; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 391-93. 
13 Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 412-15 (“CATV systems thus do not interfere in any 
traditional sense with the copyright holders’ means of extracting recompense for their creativity or 
labor.”); Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 399-402 (“[A] CATV system no more than enhances the 
viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals.”). 
14 Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 397-98. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 399. 
17 e Court explained that “a CATV system [merely] provides a well-located antenna with 
an efficient connection to the viewer's television set.” Id. Similarly, “[i]f an individual erected an 
antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he 
would not be ‘performing’ the programs he received on his television set.” Id. at 400. us, the 
Court concluded that “the only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is 
erected and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.” Id. 
18 See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 709 (1984) (holding that the 1976 Act 
required cable operators to pay royalties for retransmitting copyrighted material); Sony Corp. of 
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 469 n.17 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(remarking that the Court’s previously “narrow interpretation of ‘perform’” had been “completely 
overturned” by the 1976 Act). 
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clause to the definition of performing a work “publicly” specifically to reach 
the CATV systems’ retransmissions.19 In particular, section 101 of the Act 
provides: “To perform a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit . . . a perfor-
mance . . . to the public.”20 Section 101 further provides: “To ‘transmit’ a 
performance . . . is to communicate it by any device or process whereby 
images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent.”21 
With these definitions, Congress made it a public performance to transmit 
or retransmit broadcast signals that contain copyrighted works. Because 
CATV systems, and cable providers generally, transmit such signals to the 
public, their transmissions fall within the scope of the copyright owner’s 
public-performance right. While watching a television program in the 
privacy of one’s own home remains a private performance, capturing and 
transmitting broadcast signals to the public is a public performance of the 
copyrighted television broadcasts carried in the signals. Under the 1976 Act, 
a cable provider must therefore obtain a public-performance license. 
However, to ensure that the need to obtain such licenses did not discourage 
investment in cable systems, Congress provided a statutory license in the 1976 
Act to cover cable providers’ retransmissions.22  
In Aereo, the petitioners argue that the transmit clause functionally covers 
Aereo’s activities.23 Just like cable, Aereo uses antennae to capture broadcast 
signals that contain performances of copyrighted television programs. 
Furthermore, just like cable, Aereo then retransmits those signals, and the 
embedded performances, to its subscribers. While the individual subscribers 
receive the performances in different places—each in their own homes—
that, too, is just like cable. Given that Congress defined “publicly” 
performing a work specifically to ensure that cable retransmission is a 
public performance, the petitioners argue that Aereo’s activities must also 
be public performances. 
Aereo, on the other hand, insists that the transmit clause does not reach 
its activities. Its service, Aereo argues, is not the equivalent of cable, but 
 
19 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § ���, �� Stat. ����, ���� (codified at �� U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2012)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5677 (“[A] cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.”). 
20 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
21 Id. 
22 17 U.S.C. §111(d). Rather than negotiate with copyright owners individually, cable providers 
need only pay a compulsory licensing fee set by the Copyright Office. See WNET, irteen v. 
Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685-86 n.8 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014). 
23 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 693 (“Plaintiffs argue that holding that Aereo's transmissions are not 
public performances exalts form over substance, because the Aereo system is functionally 
equivalent to a cable television provider.”). 
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rather the equivalent of installing rooftop antennae.24 While Congress 
defined public performance to reach cable retransmission, it refused to give 
copyright owners an exclusive right to perform their works privately.25 Just 
as under the 1909 Act, watching a television program in one’s own home 
remained a private performance, and as such, falls outside the scope of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive right. Because such performances are private, a 
company that sells and installs rooftop antennae to enable consumers to 
watch a television broadcast in the privacy of their own homes also remains 
outside the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive right. Such activity 
remains outside the copyright owner’s exclusive right even if a company 
installs rooftop antennae on thousands of homes.26 In Aereo’s view, that is 
all Aereo is doing. Unlike traditional cable or CATV systems, Aereo does 
not use just a few large antennae to capture a broadcast signal, and then 
retransmit that one captured signal to all of its subscribers. Rather, it uses 
thousands of tiny antennae, each one specifically assigned to an individual 
subscriber. In Aereo’s view, if installing rooftop antennae does not infringe 
the public-performance right, then neither should its service.  
Two of the three judges on the Second Circuit panel agreed with 
Aereo’s characterization, while the third agreed with the petitioners’.27 
Curiously, both the majority and the dissent insisted that the statute’s plain 
language is unambiguous and dictates their result.28 e statute’s language 
is not, however, unambiguous. A careful parsing of the statutory language 
reveals at least three potential ambiguities. The first arises from the phrase 
 
24 See generally id. (adopting Aereo’s argument and noting that “[i]t is beyond dispute that 
the transmission of a broadcast TV program received by an individual's rooftop antenna to the TV 
in his living room is private”). e Second Circuit further found “no reason why the result [in 
favor of finding a private performance] should be any different when [a] rooftop antenna is rented 
from Aereo and its signals transmitted over the Internet: it remains the case that only one person 
can receive that antenna's transmissions.” Id. 
25 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 107-12, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546-�� (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–13 (2012)) (listing various “[l]imitations on exclusive rights”). 
26 As Justice Stewart explained, writing for the Court in Fortnightly Corp., “mere quantitative 
contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability in the context of television 
broadcasting,” since under such a scheme, “many people who make large contributions to 
television viewing might find themselves liable for copyright infringement—not only the 
apartment house owner who erects a common antenna for his tenants, but the shopkeeper who 
sells or rents television sets, and, indeed, every television set manufacturer.” Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968). 
27 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
28 Compare Aereo, 712 F.3d at 695 (“[e statutory] language and its legislative history . . . 
compels the conclusion that Aereo’s transmissions are not public performances.”), with id. at 698 
(Chin, J., dissenting) (“It is apparent that Aereo’s system fits squarely within the plain meaning of 
the statute.”). 
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“to transmit”29 and the question of volition. In the Aereo set-up, an antenna 
picks up the signal, and a wire or cable carries the signal to the individual 
subscriber’s home. If this constitutes a transmission, who transmits the 
performance at issue: Aereo by creating the system, or its subscriber by 
selecting a program for viewing? e second ambiguity arises from the 
phrase “a performance”30 and its interaction with Aereo’s multiple, individually 
assigned antennae. Is each antenna capturing and transmitting the same 
performance or is each antenna capturing and transmitting a separate 
performance? e third ambiguity arises from applying the phrase “to the 
public”31 to Aereo’s multiple, individually assigned antennae. Since each 
antenna is individually assigned, each antenna transmits the signal to only 
one subscriber. Is such a transmission “to the public”?  
We could of course resolve each of these ambiguities, as both the 
majority and the dissent in the Second Circuit implicitly did, by pretending 
that Aereo’s service is either (i) the technical equivalent of a cable system,32 
or (ii) the technical equivalent of a thousand rooftop antennae on a thousand 
private homes.33 If Aereo’s service were the technical equivalent of just one 
of these, then one could simply adopt the corresponding legal treatment and 
resolve the ambiguities accordingly. e problem is that Aereo’s service, as 
a technical matter, is the equivalent of both cable providers and rooftop 
antennae installers. 
II. FINDING A SENSIBLE PATH FORWARD 
Rather than pretend that a search for the right technical equivalent can 
provide meaningful guidance, we ought instead to look for economic 
equivalence. Specifically, we should determine whether, given its market 
position, imposing on Aereo the duty to obtain public-performance licenses 
for its activities would have economic consequences more similar to (i) 
those that follow from requiring cable systems to obtain such licenses, or 
(ii) those that would follow if we were to require companies that sold and 
installed rooftop antennae to obtain such licenses.  
The underlying economics indicate that the key difference between cable 
providers and rooftop antennae installers is the fact that cable providers are 
 
29 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting) (“Aereo is doing precisely what cable companies, 
satellite television companies, and authorized Internet streaming companies do.”).  
33 See generally id. at 690 (noting that “[n]o other Aereo user can ever receive a transmission 
from that copy”). 
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likely to have market power, while rooftop antennae installers are not. e 
economic consequences of extending public-performance rights to these 
intermediaries depends, in three important ways, on whether they enjoy 
market power. First, market-power presence determines whether public-
performance licensing fees will come out of the intermediary’s pocket, or, 
alternatively, be passed along to consumers. In the absence of market 
power, any licensing fee imposed on the intermediary will simply be passed 
along to consumers in the form of higher prices for the intermediary’s 
service.34 Consumers already pay for private performances of the television 
programs by making themselves available to watch associated commercials.35 
Charging consumers twice, once in the form of advertisements and a second 
time in the form of a passed-along licensing fee, is neither fair nor efficient. 
It is unfair because it forces some consumers to pay twice for broadcast 
television, while others pay only once—based purely on the fortuitous 
happenstance of whether a consumer’s residence is well located to capture 
television broadcasts using an antenna. It is inefficient because, by raising 
prices, it creates deadweight loss.36  
Second, the presence of market power determines whether the intermediary 
will earn rents from the performances of the copyrighted television programs 
at issue. Where market power and its associated rents are present, extending 
the public-performance right to cover the intermediary’s activities enables 
copyright owners to capture (or recapture) from the intermediary a share of 
the rents their works make possible.  
ird, market-power presence determines the extent to which a public-
performance licensing fee offers copyright owners a new revenue source. As 
discussed, in the absence of market power, a licensing fee will be passed 
along to consumers. The licensing fee thereby reduces the money consumers 
have available to spend on the products and services advertised on the 
television programs they watch. Rather than creating an additional source 
of revenue for copyright owners, imposing a licensing requirement on 
intermediaries that lack market power will tend to cannibalize the revenue 
 
34 This trend is well known in economics. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 294-96 (5th ed. 1999) (explaining the extent to 
which a tax on producers will be passed along to consumers, and showing that the effect on 
consumers depends on supply elasticity (market-power presence)). 
35 Whether consumers directly infringe copyrighted television programs by recording them 
and then skipping the commercials when they play back the programs is a separate question. See 
generally Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
“commercial-skipping does not implicate Fox’s copyright interest because Fox owns the copyrights 
to the television programs, not to the ads aired in the commercial breaks”).  
36 See generally VARIAN, supra note 34, at 296-98 (explaining “the lost value to the consumers 
and producers due to the reduction in sales of the good”). 
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copyright owners would otherwise earn from advertising associated with 
their copyrighted television programs. 
As a result, if Congress were to extend the public-performance right to 
reach intermediaries that operate in a competitive market (like rooftop 
antennae installers), the resulting licensing fee would simply be passed 
along to consumers in the form of higher prices. It would force consumers 
to pay twice for watching the copyrighted works at issue. Consumers would 
pay both the customary charge for broadcast television programs by watching 
(or making themselves available to watch) associated commercials, as well as 
a surcharge in the form of a licensing fee tacked on to the price of a rooftop 
antennae. Moreover, no part of the licensing fee would be paid out of the 
pocket of the intermediary—the rooftop antennae installers—nor would 
imposing such a fee enable copyright owners to recapture some of the rents 
that the installers were earning from enabling the performances at issue. In 
a competitive market, antennae installers would not earn any rents from 
their services, or from the performances of the copyrighted works that their 
services make possible.37 Rather, they would earn only normal, competitive 
returns on the costs of installing antennae. For the same reason, extending 
the public-performance right to intermediaries facing a competitive 
marketplace also would not offer copyright owners a new revenue source. 
Whatever additional money they could collect from a public-performance 
license would, in a competitive market, come directly from consumers. e 
public-performance license would thereby reduce the revenue copyright 
owners earn from their existing, advertising-based revenue stream. 
In contrast, if Congress extends the public-performance right to reach 
intermediaries with market power, such as cable providers,38 the consequences 
 
37 However, even in a perfectly competitive market, non-marginal participants may earn 
some rents. ese rents do not arise from the copyrighted works, but rather from, for example, an 
antennae installer’s exceptional skill and talent. ere is no reason to extend the public-
performance right to enable copyright owners to claim a share of the rents exceptional individuals 
earn from their own talents. 
38 During the 1970s, pervasive price regulation limited the cable companies’ ability to exploit 
their market power. When the industry was deregulated following the Cable Franchise and 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, the full extent of cable’s monopoly power became apparent. 
As then-Senator Al Gore stated: “Precipitous rate hikes of 100 percent or more in one year have 
not been unusual since cable was given total freedom to charge whatever the market will bear.” 135 
CONG. REC. S5692 (daily ed. May 18, 1989); see also Kathleen A. Carroll & Douglas J. Lamdin, 
Measuring Market Response to Regulation of the Cable TV Industry, 5 J. REG. ECON. 385, 385 (1993) 
(finding evidence in changes in prices that cable possessed “elements of natural monopoly”). Cf. 
John W. Mayo & Yasuji Otsuka, Demand, Pricing, and Regulation: Evidence from the Cable TV 
Industry, 22 RAND J. ECON. 396 (1991) (”[W]hile regulation did not lead to economically efficient . . . 
prices for basic cable service, it did act to keep prices below monopoly levels.”).  
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would be quite different. Cable providers are likely earning rents from their 
transmissions of copyrighted works. Given their market power, part of the 
public-performance licensing fee—and in some cases, the entire fee—would 
come out of those rents.39 It would not be passed—at least not in its entirety—
to consumers. Consequently, imposing such a fee on cable providers does 
not raise the same concern about double-charging consumers as imposing a 
fee on antennae installers. Moreover, because an intermediary with market 
power earns rents from the performances of copyrighted works, imposing 
such a fee would also enable copyright owners to share in the rents that the 
intermediary earns from the performances of copyrighted works. erefore, 
the fee both prevents the intermediary from unjustly enriching itself on 
 
Some may argue that cable either does not presently or will not in the future have significant 
market power. Compare, e.g., SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM 
INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 2, 64, 113, 172 (2013) (arguing 
that cable will have a monopoly over high-speed Internet access), with Christopher S. Yoo, 
Technological Determinism and Its Discontents, 127 HARV. L. REV. 914, 918-28 (2014) (reviewing 
CRAWFORD, supra) (arguing that digital subscriber line (DSL) services or wireless broadband 
services may limit cable’s market power over Internet access). However, at the time that Congress 
enacted the Copyright Act of ����, it is fair to characterize cable as having had significant market 
power over its subscribers.  
39 is, too, is a well known result in economics. See generally VARIAN, supra note 34, at 401-
05 (explaining the concept of economic rent). e licensing-fee portion that comes from the 
intermediary’s pocket and the portion that comes from the consumers’ both depend on the 
elasticity of supply and demand in the market, as well as the nature of the licensing fee (e.g., 
lump-sum, percentage of revenue, or per-play).  
For an example of a case where no part of the licensing fee would be passed to consumers, 
consider radio stations. Because of limitations on the permissible broadcasting spectrum and the 
need for a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) license, radio stations often enjoy a 
degree of market power arising from natural-monopoly characteristics. ey are therefore likely to 
make some degree of monopoly profits from their performance of musical works. By recognizing 
those performances as public, the current scheme enables the copyright owners in musical works to 
negotiate for a share of those profits.  
Moreover, no part of the radio station’s licensing fee is likely to be passed to consumers. 
Whether or not a radio station must pay a public-performance royalty, the airtime that the radio 
station devotes to advertisements will remain unchanged. Increasing advertising airtime increases 
the airtime that the station can sell, but it will eventually begin to reduce the price the station can 
charge for advertisements—both by increasing the supply of airtime available, and by leading the 
station’s audience to switch to other stations. A radio station determines the fraction of airtime 
devoted to advertisements by balancing these two marginal effects to maximize its revenue. The 
existence or absence of a licensing fee will not change the station’s analysis. us, any licensing fee 
that the radio station pays will not be passed to consumers. 
However, this trait does not mean that a license requirement and its corresponding fee come 
without cost. Requiring a public-performance license from radio stations reduces the stations’ 
profitability. This reduction will not have much impact in larger markets, where a radio station 
will remain sufficiently profitable such that the radio dial will still be full. However, the reduction 
is likely to reduce the number of radio stations in less populous and rural markets, where radio 
stations are more likely to operate at the margins of profitability.  
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another’s works, while offering copyright owners an additional source of 
revenue. While a cable provider’s rents come out of consumers’ pockets and 
thus have a similar tendency to cannibalize advertising revenue, a licensing 
fee allows copyright owners to capture some of the revenue that would 
otherwise go from consumers to the cable provider in any event.  
Overall, market power provides a sensible reason for Congress’s decision 
to distinguish between cable providers and antennae installers on the 
public-performance issue. e fact that cable providers generally have 
market power, while antennae installers do not, provides a sensible basis for 
requiring a license (and an associated fee) from one intermediary, but not 
the other.  
Here, the underlying economics of Aereo’s service indicate that its 
market situation is more similar to that of an antennae installer than a cable 
provider. However, the key difference between Aereo and traditional cable 
is not the use of many, rather than just a few, antennae to collect the signal. 
Rather, the key difference between Aereo and a cable provider is the fact 
that a traditional cable provider transmits the broadcast over its own cable 
network to its subscribers’ homes, while Aereo transmits a signal over the 
Internet from an antenna to an individual home.  
The suggestion that this difference in transmission method is key may 
seem strange at first blush: Why should it matter whether the retransmission 
occurs over a company’s own cable network or the Internet? Yet, after 
rationalizing the public-performance right, this distinction emerges as the 
material difference between cable and Aereo. The difference in transmission 
method determines the extent to which, because of natural-monopoly 
considerations, a company will have market power over the transmission.  
e natural-monopoly character of cable arises not merely from its high 
fixed and low marginal costs, but also from government sanction. For a 
company to transmit a signal over its own wires, it has historically been 
necessary to lay cable, whether copper wire or fiber optic, to each and every 
individual home and business. Negotiating for permission to lay cable 
across private property can prove expensive and often impractical. To 
overcome these difficulties, cable companies usually rely on the delegated 
power of eminent domain to obtain the necessary easements. Counties and 
municipalities typically delegate their power of eminent domain to only one 
cable provider. As a result, in most markets, there is only one cable service.40 
 
40 is is certainly true where the author lives. On this issue more generally, see MARK 
COOPER, CABLE MERGERS AND MONOPOLIES: MARKET POWER IN DIGITAL MEDIA AND 
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS 19-38 (2002) (discussing the long tradition of cable monopolies, 
“born with franchise monopoly service territories in the 1970s”). 
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While other options, such as satellite, exist, these alternatives differ from 
cable in important ways (e.g., cable companies lay and transmit over their 
own lines, while satellite companies do not), such that cable retains 
considerable market power.  
Aereo, by contrast, may have some initial market power because of its 
entrepreneurial skill and risk-taking, but it does not have any natural 
monopoly power. So long as Internet service providers may not discriminate 
between the bits they carry,41 anyone can set up a similar service and 
compete with Aereo. If Aereo continues to earn rents from its service, 
competitors will likely enter the market once legal rules become clear. 
Aereo’s market situation is thus more similar to that of rooftop-antennae 
companies than it is to the cable service providers’. Just as with antennae 
installers, extending the public-performance right to Aereo’s activities 
would not enable copyright owners to recapture a share of the rents Aereo 
earns from the performances Aereo makes possible. Facing a pending 
competitive market, Aereo, just like antennae installers, will not earn (or at 
least will not earn for long) any rents from its performances—only a 
reasonable return on the cost of its service. Similarly, instead of requiring a 
licensing fee paid solely from Aereo’s pockets, extending the public-
performance right to Aereo would lead to Aereo’s customers being charged 
twice: first through advertisements associated with the copyrighted programs, 
and second through the passed-along licensing fee. is fee would also 
reduce, on a dollar-for-dollar basis,42 the money consumers have available to 
spend on advertised products. Instead of offering copyright owners a new 
and additional revenue stream, a licensing fee would instead tend to cannibalize 
copyright owners’ existing advertising revenue stream. 
This approach thus suggests that the Second Circuit resolved Aereo 
correctly. Given the underlying economics, Aereo’s activities are analogous 
 
41 Nondiscrimination’s effect on the market is one of the reasons that the net-neutrality 
debate is so important. See generally Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking 
the FCC’s net-neutrality rules, but not the FCC’s power to reimpose them on a case-by-case basis 
under section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act). 
42 is phrase distinguishes between the differing effects of a licensing fee in competitive 
versus naturally monopolistic markets. In a competitive market, the fee is simply passed to 
consumers. us, every dollar amount of the licensing fee comes directly from consumers thereby 
reducing (by the same dollar amount) the amount that consumers have available to spend on 
advertised products.  
In contrast, in the monopolistic market, the intermediary absorbs part of the fee. While part 
of the licensing fee may be passed to consumers, each dollar in licensing-fee revenue will come 
partly from the intermediary’s rents and partly from consumers. As a result, in the monopolistic 
market, one dollar paid through a licensing fee will reduce the amount that consumers have 
available to spend by less than one dollar.  
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to a thousand rooftop antennae installed on a thousand private homes, not 
to a cable service provider. e Court should therefore interpret the public-
performance right’s ambiguous language so that the right does not reach 
Aereo’s activities.43  
III. A RATIONAL PUBLIC-PERFORMANCE RIGHT 
In this essay, I suggest that we should define the public-performance 
right to reach those intermediaries likely to possess market power due to the 
natural-monopoly character of their service. This approach not only suggests 
the proper resolution in Aereo, but it also explains and justifies some 
otherwise puzzling distinctions in the Copyright Act.44 While this approach 
 
43 is approach also suggests that if a cable provider were to use a thousand tiny antennae 
and then to assign one to each individual homeowner, subsequent cable transmissions would 
remain public performances so long as the signals are transmitted over the cable provider’s own 
wires. Some may argue that treating Aereo’s thousand tiny, individually assigned antennae 
differently from a cable provider’s thousand tiny, individually assigned antennae stretches the 
statutory language further than it can bear. To the extent that the same result would apply in both 
cases, the appropriate solution is to exclude Aereo from the scope of the public-performance right 
today and worry about the cable provider possibility if and when it arises. First of all, such an 
approach obtains the correct answer in the case presently before the Court, instead of choosing an 
incorrect answer for fear of how cable providers may respond in the future. Second, even if cable 
providers legally could switch to Aereo’s model in order to avoid the licensing fees, they may not 
choose to do so. ird, if cable providers do begin to switch to thousands of tiny, individually 
assigned antennae, at some point, their actions may then spur congressional action. Even so, it is 
still preferable to define the public-performance right narrowly in this case and place the burden 
on copyright owners to persuade Congress to rewrite relevant statutory language if and when it 
becomes necessary. As the addition of the transmit clause in response to the Fortnightly Corp. and 
Teleprompter Corp. cases demonstrates, see supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text, copyright 
owners have the ability to persuade Congress to revise the scope of their rights when it becomes 
necessary and desirable to do so.  
44 For example, the public-performance right reaches broadcasters but not companies that 
manufacture and sell televisions and radios. Both enable private performances of copyrighted 
works, so why should one be liable for a public performance but not the other? In Fortnightly Corp., 
the Court explained that this distinction arose historically by treating broadcasters as exhibitors, 
and the viewer as “a member of a theatre audience.” Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc. 392 U.S. 390, 398 (1968). In other words, “[b]roadcasters perform,” while 
“[v]iewers do not perform.” Id.  
However, under the definition of “perform” in the ���� Act, this distinction can no longer 
hold. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2543 (codified at �� 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (“To ‘perform’ a work means . . . in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.”). Under this definition, both broadcaster and viewer could theoretically “perform” a 
work; both broadcaster and viewer could “show” a recorded motion picture in the viewer’s home. 
Nevertheless, treating broadcasters’ actions as a public performance, while treating as private the 
actions of all the other companies that make it possible for consumers to watch television in their 
own homes, remains sensible to the extent broadcasters, but not television manufacturers, have 
market power arising from the natural-monopoly character of their markets.  
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does not explain the outcomes in all of the cases dealing with the public-
performance issue,45 it provides a rational basis for distinguishing between 
intermediaries, all of which offer goods or services that ultimately enable 
private performances of copyrighted works.  
Where the intermediary at issue likely has market power arising from 
the natural-monopoly character of their service, one can plausibly justify 
extending the public-performance right to cover that intermediary’s activities. 
However, where the intermediary faces a more competitive market, as 
Aereo will, one should not extend the public-performance right to the 
intermediary’s activities. In such a case, any licensing fee would be passed 
to consumers through higher prices for the intermediary’s service. Because 
the licensing fee would be passed to consumers, requiring a license would 
have three unattractive economic consequences. First, it would force 
consumers to pay twice for the same performance. Second, for copyright 
owners, a licensing fee would not recapture a share of the rents that the 
intermediary was earning from the copyrighted works. ird, the licensing 
fee would not provide copyright owners a new and additional source of 
revenue.  
 As long as Congress gives copyright owners an exclusive right to perform 
their works publicly, but not an exclusive right to perform their works 
privately, courts will have to draw a line between the two kinds of performances. 
In cases where an intermediary provides a good or service that enables 
members of the public to perform a copyrighted work privately, the inter-
mediary’s likely market power provides a sensible basis for drawing that 
line.  
 
A market-power explanation can similarly justify the outcome in the noteworthy case involving 
Cablevision, Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. See 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(holding that providing a remote digital video recorder that subscribers could use to record and 
transmit copyrighted television programs does not infringe the public-performance right). ough 
the defendant in that case was a cable provider and thus likely had market power, it did not have 
market power with respect to the remote storage digital video recorder service at issue. For that 
particular service, if Cablevision tried to charge a monopoly price, consumers could simply 
substitute a competitively priced set-top digital video recorder. 
45 For example, the proposed approach suggests that the ird Circuit resolved the public-
performance issue incorrectly in both Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 
154 (3d Cir. 1984), and Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986). 
However, given that the ird Circuit may have incorrectly decided both cases, this application 
serves more as a feature than as a flaw of the proposed approach. As I have explained elsewhere, 
these cases represent the motion picture industries’ attempt to overturn the first sale doctrine with 
the public-performance right. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., e Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, 
Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 903-04 (2001) 
(“[W]hen movie rentals first became popular, a group of movie studios set out to obtain a judicial 
ruling barring such rentals. Recognizing that the first sale doctrine posed a substantial obstacle . . . , 
the studios began by suing a video rental that offered in-store viewing.” (footnote omitted)).  
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